scheme practiced by merchants in all lines of business, the decision would seem to strain the definition of what constitutes a sufficient difference in occupations to relieve an ordinance of this sort from the fatal defect of being unjustly discriminatory. See COOLEY CONST. LIM. 7th Ed., p. 556, 557. No cases have been found deciding the exact questions here involved but license regulations have been held void on the ground of discrimination where certain classes of dentists were exempted from the operation of a dentist license laws: *State* v. *Hinman,* 65 N. H. 103, 18 Atl. 194; where dairies were prohibited within a certain locality and the city council given authority to grant permission within such district: *State* v. *Mahner,* 43 La. Ann. 496, 9 So. 480; where an ordinance discriminated between peddlers living within a city and those without: *Morgan* v. *Orange,* 50 N. J. L. 389; and between meat dealers in different portions of the same city: *St. Louis* v. *Spiegel,* 75 Mo. 145; see also *Chicago* v. *Netcher,* 183 Ill. 104, 55 N. E. 707. On the other hand regulations have been held valid which required a license of stock-raisers engaged in sheep-raising: *Ex parte Mirande,* 73 Cal. 365, 14 Pac. 888; and of the keepers of temporary restaurants but not of those permanently engaged in the business: *Commonwealth* v. *Bearse,* 132 Mass. 542, 42 Am. Rep. 450; and of those engaged in the practice of medicine, *Iowa College Ass'n* v. *Schrader,* 87 Ia. 659, 55 N. W. 24. So also an act providing special regulations for partnerships doing business under fictitious names has been held valid: *Hartzell* v. *Warren,* 11 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 269.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—TRADING STAMP LAWS.—Petitioner was imprisoned under a charge of misdemeanor for violating the "Anti-Trade Stamp or Coupon Act." *Held,* a trading stamp given by a merchant to a customer which entitles him to credit for other goods subsequently purchased, is a contract which the Legislature cannot prohibit or impair under the police power, and this act attempting to do so is void. *Ex parte Drexel* (1905), — Cal. —, 82 Pac. Rep. 429.

A great many cases on this subject have been decided during the past few years, and similar statutes have generally been declared unconstitutional on two grounds. 1st. They interfere with the personal rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. *Young* v. *Commonwealth,* 101 Va. 853, holding, the liberty of a citizen guaranteed by the constitution, embraces not only the right to go where one chooses, but to follow such lawful pursuits as one may deem best adapted to his faculties. See *Powell* v. *Penn.* 127 U. S. 678, and *Allgeyer* v. *Louisiana,* 165 U. S. 578 (1896). 2nd. They cannot be upheld as a police regulation because no question of public health, safety, or morals is involved. See *State* v. *Dalton,* 22 R. I. 77, 46 Atl. 234 (1900). This proposition is so generally recognized that it is not necessary to cite further authorities. For further discussion, see 2 MICH. LAW REV. 224, 3 *ib.* 234, 662.

CORPORATIONS—AMENDMENT OF CHARTER—SERVICE ON—LIBERTY TO CONTRACT.—Application by the state for a writ of mandamus, under a statute requiring non-resident corporations to appoint the State Auditor as their attorney to accept service of process and notice, and to pay him $10 yearly for his services, which fee he was to pay into the state treasury. The general